This blog posting is inspired by delegations of Tibetans, sent by the Chinese Government, that are currently visiting Europe, Australia and New Zealand. One is led by Jampa Phuntsok, the head of the Tibet Autonomous Region’s People’s Congress in Lhasa, while the other is led by Tanzen Lhundup, a scholar at the China Tibetology Research Center in Beijing. As I monitor their trips, I am beginning to mentally compare the work these delegations seem to be doing not only on the familiar “cross-strait relations” but also with a less known development, which I would call “cross-pass relations” between Tibetans in Tibet and those outside of Tibet.
When we talk about China’s role in the international community one of the issues that comes up is that of cross-strait relations, namely China’s contact with Taiwan. Much has been written on this, including developments where increasing people-to-people contact are being established between Taiwanese and Chinese. Several thousand Taiwanese have not only been allowed comparative freedom to visit China but also to undertake business ventures. During one of the visits of envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to China (I was a member of the team), we visited Kunshan in Jiangsu Province where we were informed about the many Taiwanese people who have resettled there.
Similarly, Chinese citizens have more freedom in getting passports and visiting Taiwan to meet their friends and relatives or for tourism purposes than in the past. In order to facilitate these relations, direct flights to Taiwan have been established by the Chinese government.
Although there is no doubt that the Chinese authorities have officials monitoring the Taiwanese, there does seem to be some space given to them to undertake regular activities without political interference. In short, despite the political difference between Taiwan and China, the Chinese government has been making serious efforts in encouraging people across the strait to establish cordial relations.
But then take a look at the situation on relations between Tibetans in Tibet and “overseas” Tibetans. Even though the basis is more or less similar, the approach the Chinese government has adopted shows a bias against the Tibetans.
Just as there are many Taiwanese who have ethnic roots and relatives in China and thus have an emotional connection, the “overseas” Tibetans look to Tibet as their homeland and have relatives there. Just like the Taiwanese, the Tibetans have a political disagreement with China. Again, just as is the situation among Taiwanese, there are Tibetans who favor rapprochement with China and those who don’t.
Despite these similarities, the Tibetan people, whether in Tibet or outside, are being looked upon by the Chinese authorities with suspicions and mistrust. Tibetans in Tibet are second class citizens without any enjoyment of equal rights as their Chinese neighbors. A case in point is freedom of movement. Despite relaxations in passport rules that has facilitated acquiring the document for millions of ethnic Chinese, when it comes to Tibetans they seem to have a different set of rules that makes it much harder. It is only a handful of Tibetans in Tibet who are able to attain passports and whose desire to go on pilgrimages to Nepal and India (where most of the sacred Buddhist sites are located) are fulfilled. While on this, the Hui people in China get better consideration as the Chinese government itself makes arrangements for their annual pilgrimages to Mecca. This is what we were informed when we visited the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
As for Tibetans abroad being able to visit their relatives in Tibet or to go on pilgrimages to Lhasa and other sacred sites, again only a handful of people may get permission from the Chinese authorities. Tibetan Americans or Tibetans who are citizens of other countries are discriminated against by the Chinese embassies, with their visa applications being processed differently and more often than not being rejected, merely because of their race.
In short, when it comes to Tibetans, instead of any official support for better contact, the Chinese government does everything to create division. The delegations that the Chinese government sends, like the one that inspired this blog, have the task of creating the impression to the domestic Chinese audience that the international community, as well as the “overseas Tibetans,” recognize them as Tibetan representatives. This is achieved by the government-controlled Chinese media hyping low-level official meetings and projecting meetings with some Tibetans residing abroad (who may be indebted to the Chinese authorities) as indicators.
However, at a personal level, there has been and continues to be very creative “cross-pass relations” between the Tibetan communities residing across the two sides of the Himalayan range. At one level we find many Tibetans from Tibet risking their lives to cross the Himalayan passes to visit their friends and relatives outside, to receive the blessings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and to go on pilgrimages in India and Nepal.
At an unofficial level, for every “China’s Tibetan” delegation that is sent abroad there may be dozens more Tibetans in Tibet, individuals and groups, who are able to interact with their brethren abroad. Unfortunately, given the way the Chinese government has been acting towards Tibetans these are done behind their watchful eyes. I am not saying these interactions have a political motive or are being done to collude against the Chinese government. Rather, these are the product of the natural desire by people who have much in common but are being kept divided on account of the political exigencies of the Chinese government. I have been part of such meetings and have always found them emotionally charged. There is the outpouring of feelings from both the sides. The admiration of those Tibetans abroad at what the Tibetans in Tibet are able to do under the very constrained situation goes without saying.
Many Tibetans in Tibet are inspired by the achievements of their fellow brethren in exile, whether it is something that the Tibetan diaspora take for granted, like being able to speak English fluently, or getting admission to Harvard University (apparently the Chinese leadership considers that to be the mother of all universities). They are fans of music composed by young Tibetans abroad and acknowledge the efficacy of traditional Tibetan medicines that are produced in Dharamsala (compared to those produced in Tibet) as they incorporate the necessary spiritual component. Of course, they also have admiration for institutions that Tibetans in exile have set up that have not only preserved and promoted Tibetan culture but also brought international fame.
But these are things that you would not get to hear from the official delegations because all Tibetans – on both sides of the passes – know of the dire consequences in Tibet for revealing “state secrets.”
I’ve heard there have been proposals for the Chinese government to treat Tibet as they do Taiwan and Hong Kong – under a “One country, two systems” arrangement.
What happened with that proposal and what are some of the positive and negative implications of such an arrangement? Anyone care to share some info on this?
The statement that “several thousand” Taiwan Chinese have been allowed to visit and even establish businesses in Mainland China is way off the mark.
Today about 5% of the Taiwan population — a figure that amounts to nearly one million people — live and work in Mainland China. Anyone from Taiwan may cross the Straits and visit the Mainland for education, tourism, work or family reunions (with the usual exception of those with criminal records and/or suspected divisive political agendas).These numbers were nearly as high and growing even during the Chen Shui-bian period.
In the last year or so record levels of Mainland Chinese, primarily tourists with cash to spend, have been flocking to Taiwan and Quemoy in numbers reaching many thousands each month. The Taiwan government monitors these numbers closely so that the island is not overwhelmed producing a nasty political backlash.